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ASSET FORFEITURE (MODERN ANTI-DRUG
WEAPON): IS BANKRUPTCY A "DEFENSE"?
I. INTRODUCTION
Asset forfeiture statutes provide law enforcement officials with po-
tent weapons with which to confiscate the proceeds and instrumentalities
of crime.' Today it is urged that such laws be used extensively in the war
against the sale and use of illegal narcotics.2 Changes in the applicable
federal statutes and the enactment of various state laws have resulted in
the frequent use of forfeiture laws by prosecutors. This has prompted
opposing counsel, seeking to protect their client's assets, to assert a vari-
ety of defenses.3 In addition to the conventional defenses, the tactic of
filing for relief in bankruptcy by the property owner might be employed.
As a result, the owner's property would be placed under the direct con-
trol of the bankruptcy court, not the district court. The government
would then be in a position behind the unsecured creditors when it came
to distribution of the assets of the bankrupt estate. Even more impor-
tantly, the forfeiture action would be stayed pending determination by
the bankruptcy court. In certain circumstances, the forfeiture action
could become a fruitless pursuit, thus achieving the wrongdoer's objec-
tive of avoiding the forfeiture and its criminal overtones.
Such a result should not be tolerated by the courts as it is contrary
to the legislative intent behind both the forfeiture laws and the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Further, the exercise of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy
court over the forfeiture proceeding may violate article III of the Consti-
tution. Additionally, the long-standing doctrine of "relation back" ne-
cessitates that the forfeiture proceeding precede any action by the
bankruptcy court inasmuch as a ruling on the forfeiture will determine
what remains in the bankrupt estate.
1. Forfeiture of property can attach for the violation of a wide range of laws. See Kandaras,
Due Process and Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need for Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing,
34 Sw. L.J. 925, 925-28 (1980).
2. Asset Forfeiture Urged as Effective Law Enforcement Tool, 16 CRIM. JUST. NEWSL., Nov.
15, 1985, at 5.
3. Such defenses are asserted not only for the benefit of the client, but also for the attorney
whose fee may be forfeitable if traceable to criminal proceeds. See Bernholz & Herman, Fending Off
Forfeiture, 21 TRIAL, Dec. 1985, at 70.
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II. FORFEITURE BACKGROUND AND PURPOSES
A. Generally
Forfeiture has been used throughout the history of both the Ameri-
can and English legal systems, though in different forms.' Generally,
forfeiture of property is the process by which a person or entity is com-
pletely divested of all rights in certain property based on the commission
of an illegal act.' English law held a felony as an act for which "corrup-
tion of blood" attached.6 This "corruption of blood" disentitled the
felon's heirs to any and all rights they had in the property of the felon.7
This complete divestiture of a felon's entire estate is constitutionally pro-
hibited in the United States.8 Today, however, United States courts ac-
knowledge that forfeiture statutes are valid9 as long as they affect only
certain property criminally connected, not necessarily the felon's entire
estate.l°
Generally speaking, a forfeiture cannot be accomplished without
statutory authority.II Additionally, forfeiture statutes are not judicially
favored and should be narrowly construed; 2 forfeiture should be en-
forced only when the case falls within the "letter and spirit" of the stat-
ute.13 Consequently, effective modem forfeiture statutes are very specific
as to what behavior will result in forfeiture, what property is forfeitable,
and which claimants (innocent or culpable) are affected.
4. For a detailed account of the history of forfeiture in England, see Note, Bane of American
Forfeiture Law-Banished At Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768 (1977).
5. 37 CJ.S. Forfeitures § 1 (1943).
6. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 (4th Cir.) (citing I J. BISHoP, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 581-83 (1882)), cerit denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980).
7. Id. The court in Grande discusses the history of "corruption of blood" at length. Grande,
620 F.2d at 1037-39.
8. Id. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 states: "The Congress shall have the Power to declare the
Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work a Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture
except during the Life of the Person attained."
9. The court in Grande stated that article III was not "intended to prohibit anything other
than corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate as imposed at common law." Grande, 620 F.2d at
1039.
10. See generally Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-84 (1974).
11. King v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 767, 772 (D. Colo. 1968) (pre-conviction forfeiture
"cannot be maintained unless authorized by an applicable statute") (quoting United States v. Lane
Motor Co., 199 F.2d 495, 496-97 (10th Cir.), aff'd, 344 U.S. 630 (1952).
12. See United States v. One (1) 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F.2d 500, 501 (5th Cir.
1981) (citing United States v. One Ford Coach, 307 U.S. 219 (1929)).
13. The court in Unted States v. Premises Known as 3639 2d Street, 869 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir.
1989), reviewed forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 and held that "forfeitures are not favored; they
should be enforced only when within both the letter and spirit of the law." Id. at 1098 (quoting
United States v. One Ford Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939)).
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B. Forfeiture and the Drug War
As a result of the heightened awareness of the drug abuse problem
in this country, forfeiture laws have been enacted and utilized by not
only the federal government, but by the states as well, to assist law en-
forcement bodies in the war against illegal narcotics.14 President George
Bush recently proposed a number of anti-drug policies and told a United
States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce meeting in New Orleans, Louisi-
ana, that the nation is "fighting for its very soul" in the war on drugs.15
The problem of illegal narcotics has been an issue for at least the last two
decades, but in this decade the problem has come to the forefront be-
cause of the tremendous sums of money involved and the appalling
amount of violence associated with those who participate in the sale and
distribution of controlled substances.
In the past the emphasis has been on incarcerating drug dealers and
users, but this method has not proven to be totally effective; drug lords
can continue to operate their illicit organizations from prison16 or, more
likely, a successor can easily step into the shoes of the drug lord when
drug profits are still available to fund the operation. The amount of
money involved in the illegal narcotics business is staggering and is the
primary motivation for its continued operation. Therefore, in addition to
stiff sentences of the continuing criminal enterprise statute, 17 it appears
that a very effective mode of attack is confiscating assets related to the
criminal enterprise, the idea being to make crime not pay.
In 1970, Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganization (RICO) statutes and the Comprehensive Drug Prevention and
14. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 13-A (Consol. 1984) is an example of a state forfeiture law en-
acted for the express purpose of controlling large scale narcotics traffickers. The law was designed to
address the problem of an increased flow of illegal drugs into the State of New York. Kessler,
Taking the Profit Out of Crime: Asset Forfeiture, 59 N.Y. ST. B.J. 48, 52 (1987).
15. Tulsa World, Sept. 9, 1989, at A-5, col. 1.
16. In her book, DESPERADOS, Elaine Shannon quotes a report made by Senator Joseph Biden
to the Senate Foreign Relations and Judiciary committees: "'DEA and the Justice Department gen-
erally have achieved, as one Justice official admitted, a "dismal record" in attacking the financial
empires and the merchandising networks of the illegal drug trade. That is a primary reason why
major violators can preserve their networks and resources and, in some cases, will continue to oper-
ate them from prison'." E. SHANNON, DESPERADOS (LATIN DRUG LORDS, U.S. LAWMEN, AND
THE WAR AMERICA CAN'T WIN) 78 (1988).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Supp. V 1987) (first offenders convicted under this section shall be sen-
tenced to not less than 20 years and up to life imprisonment, subject to fines not to exceed two
million dollars; repeat offenders are subject to 30 years to life imprisonment; both sentences elimi-
nate the possibility of parole).
1990]
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Control Act. 18 These statutes contained the first federal criminal forfei-
ture19 provisions designed to attack the "business" of illegal narcotic
sales. Nevertheless, because of numerous limitations and ambiguities
within those statutes, federal law enforcement agencies did not use them
as extensively as Congress had intended.20
To remedy the situation, Congress amended the statutes in 198421
with the expressed intent of clarifying the ambiguities.22 Additionally,
Congress added real property to the list of items which may be forfeited
for its use in furtherance of a felony violation of the Drug Abuse and
Controlled Substances Act.23 Congress hoped that the amendment
would make it possible for prosecutors to attack more successfully drug
traffickers by taking away their profits.
24
C. Types of Forfeiture Statutes
The two basic categories of forfeiture statutes are criminal forteiture
which is in personam and civil forfeiture which is in rem. 25  Criminal
forfeiture is the action brought against the person connected with the
property and charged with a violation of the law.26 On the other hand,
civil forfeiture actions are directed at the res, not necessarily accompa-
nied by a charge against the owner. 27 Prosecutors use both types in pros-
ecuting wrongdoers. However, criminal forfeiture has an added
advantage when achieved, because it results in the incarceration of the
18. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
19. See present version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(a), 853 (West Supp. 1989).
20. See S. RPP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225].
21. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837.
22. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3374.
23. Id. at 3398.
24. Id. at 3374-81.
25. 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 1 (1943); see also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20 at 82, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3264-65.
26. In personam forfeiture statutes originated in the common law where forfeiture of the prop-
erty was a consequence of conviction of a crime. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827);
United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1981).
27. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14; S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 82, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3265. These definitions have been followed by modem
courts in distinguishing between in personam and in rem forfeiture statutes. In rem forfeitures treat
the thing as if it were the offender. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
684 (1974); Florida Dealers and Growers Bank v. United States, 279 F.2d 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1960)
(forfeiture of vehicle used in violation of internal revenue laws).
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defendant as well as the forfeiture of any property criminally con-
nected.28 However, because of its civil nature, in rein forfeiture statutes
have some unique benefits to law enforcement as well.2 9
Civil forfeiture requires a substantially lower burden of proof than
its criminal counterpart. As in other criminal proceedings, criminal for-
feiture requires the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
but civil forfeiture of property can be achieved based upon a preponder-
ance of the evidence.3" Also, a civil forfeiture proceeding determines the
status of all claimants of the property subject to forfeiture, while the
criminal proceeding determines only the property right of the criminal
defendant. Because the two proceedings are not mutually exclusive, the
government can pursue a civil forfeiture even if the criminal forfeiture
was unsuccessful because the owner was acquitted of the criminal
charges or because criminal charges were never brought against the
wrongdoer/owner in the first instance.31
IIl. THE CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCESS AS A WEAPON IN THE DRUG
WAR
A. The Process
To understand the importance of civil forfeiture to prosecutors, an
analysis of the process is necessary. The government must show only
probable cause that the property was illegally derived or involved in an
illegal act by establishing a nexus between the property and some illegal
activity.32 Once this is accomplished, an interested party contesting the
forfeiture must have standing33 and must then prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the property is not connected to or derived from an
illegal transaction, and is therefore not subject to forfeiture. 34
The government may establish probable cause by showing there are
28. Long, 654 F.2d at 915.
29. Because the in rem action is a civil proceeding, the prosecutor can take advantage of the
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
30. United States v. Dunn, 802 F.2d 646, 647 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. One 1977
Lincoln Mark V, 453 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)), cert denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987).
31. Id. at 647-48.
32. United States v. One 1986 Mercedes Benz, 660 F. Supp. 410, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (inter-
preting 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)), aff'd, 846 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1988).
33. To have standing to challenge the forfeiture action, the person must claim ownership or an
interest in the property. See United States v. One Hundred Twenty-Two Thousand Forty-Three
Dollars in United States Currency, 792 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. One 1978
Piper Navajo PA-31 Aircraft, 748 F.2d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1984).
34. See United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1216-17 (10th Cir.
1986) and cases cited therein.
1990]
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"reasonable grounds" to believe there exists a link between the illegal
activity and the property.35 This standard appears to be very broad and
allows civil forfeiture proceedings to be initiated on somewhat weaker
evidence than that required for criminal forfeiture. In fact, the proof of
"reasonable grounds" can be circumstantial and based upon evidence
otherwise inadmissible3 6 as long as the court deems the source reliable.3 7
B. The Applicable In Rem Statute: Section 881
The applicable civil forfeiture statute used in the theatre of illegal
narcotics is title 21, section 881 of the United States Code (hereinafter
Section 881).38 Originally enacted in 1970, the statute has subsequently
35. United States v. All Funds and Other Property in Account Number 031-217362, 661 F.
Supp. 697, 700-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court defined "reasonable grounds" as more than "mere
suspicion" but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 700 (citing United States v. Banco
Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1160 n.7 (2d Cir. 1986)).
36. See, eg., United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 899-900 (1st
Cir. 1987) (probable cause showing need only be by "reliable" evidence-technical evidentiary rules
are "irrelevant to question of probable cause" in the context of an application to the civil forfeiture
statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881).
37. Id. at 900.
38. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a) states in part:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right
shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or
acquired in violation of this subehapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or intended
for use ... in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property described in
paragraph (1), (2), or (9).
(4) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended
for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, posses-
sion, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2) or (9)... [except that no
conveyance is forfeited if owner can establish innocence as to knowledge of or consent to
the violation].
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which
were used, or intended for use, in violation of this subchapter.
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation
of this subehapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable
instruments, aid securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this
subchapter, except no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph... [if an interest in
which owner can establish innocence as to knowledge of or consent to the violation].
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest... (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements
... [used in violation of this subchapter except if the interest owner can establish innocence
as to knowledge of or consent to the violation].
(8) All controlled substances which have been possessed in violation of this subchapter.
(9) All listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equipment, all tableting machines... [for
use in a felony violation of this subchapter].
21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
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been amended along with the other drug-related forfeiture laws.3 9 Sec-
tion 881 provides for certain property to be forfeited to the government
upon the violation of the Controlled Substances Act.4°
C. Innocence As a Defense
Courts have consistently held that a claimant's innocence is not
enough to overcome or defeat a civil forfeiture action because it is the
property being deemed guilty.4 ' However, recent amendments to the
drug enforcement forfeiture statute have necessarily reduced its harsh-
ness or severity by providing that innocent interest holders may recover
the seized property42 or the reasonable value thereof. These amendments
allow courts to construe the laws reasonably (as opposed to strictly), re-
sulting in the higher forfeiture success rate Congress intended.43
IV. BANKRUPTCY AS A "DEFENSE"
All defenses to a forfeiture action discussed thus far have been di-
rected at proving the innocence of the owner or of the property. Another
tactic may be to protect the property from being forfeited with the filing
of bankruptcy by the wrongdoer/owner. 4 Once the wrongdoer/owner
files bankruptcy, the property comes under the control of the bankruptcy
court, and section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code operates to stay all
proceedings against the estate of the wrongdoer/owner/debtor with
39. See supra notes 18 and 21.
40. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989); Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (now codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-852 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
41. See, ag., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684-88 (1974) (up-
holding Puerto Rican statute modelled after Section 881(a) providing for forfeiture of vessels used
for unlawful purpose).
42. See, eg., 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1989) which states:
[No conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an interest of an
owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed
or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner.
Id.
43. Prior to the 1984 and 1988 amendments, unfairness resulted in cases such as Calero-Toledo,
where a yacht owner lost his interest in a yacht leased to an individual caught in possession of one
marijuana cigarette. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The court determined
that such was not a taking without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment, nor a
violation of due process, and affirmed the forfeiture. Id. at 680.
44. This defense was attempted recently in a forfeiture action filed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, in United States v. SE 1/4 of SE 1/4 of Section 36,
Township I North, Range 12 East, No. 88-244-C and related cases, 88-245-C, 88-246-C, 88-247-C,
88-248-C, 88-261-C and 88-320-C (E.D. Okla. 1988). The claimant, Junior Ranch, Inc., or in the
alternative, its individual shareholders, filed Chapter 7 (liquidation) bankruptcy, seeking a stay of the
forfeiture proceedings and removal of the forfeiture to the bankruptcy court.
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some exceptions.45 If the bankruptcy court asserts jurisdiction and per-
mits the stay to remain in effect, the forfeiture proceeding would be
stalled and the government would then arguably take the posture of a
creditor.
The claimant" in the forfeiture proceeding becomes the debtor in
the bankruptcy proceeding upon the filing of a voluntary case under a
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.4 7 At that time, the claimant/debtor
could move the district court, where the forfeiture case is pending, to
stay its proceedings" and obtain from the bankruptcy court a determina-
tion that the property subject to forfeiture is part of the bankrupt es-
tate.49 Should this procedure prove successful, the government could
possibly take a position behind the unsecured creditors in the distribution
of the bankrupt estate's assets.5
45. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988) states in part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302,
or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of -
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of pro-
cess, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that
was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this
title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of
the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judg-
ment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate
or to exercise control over property of the estate ....
Id.
46. "Claimants," as used in this Comment, are those persons or entities who claim some right,
title, or interest in the property subject to forfeiture whether it be the owner/wrongdoer, creditors of
the owner/wrongdoer, or lienholders of the subject property.
47. According to 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988), "[t]he commencement of a voluntary case under a
chapter of this title constitutes an order for relief under such chapter."
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988) states in part:
Property of the estate
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an
estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by
whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equita-
ble interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
Id.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 724(a) (1988) states: "The trustee may avoid a lien that secures a claim of a
kind specified in section 726(a)(4) of this title." Id. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1988) places a claim "in
payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture...
to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not compensation for actual pecuni-
ary loss suffered by the holder of such claim" fourth in line behind the unsecured creditors. Id.
(emphasis added).
The term forfeiture contained within section 726 does not appear to be the same type of forfei-
ture as provided in 21 U.S.C. § 881. Under section 726, Congress appears to implicate the forfeiture
of property as a result of the owner's failure to pay a monetary penalty, Le., failure to pay income tax
penalties. Congress stated in the legislative history of section 726: "Paragraph (4) provides that
8
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Clearly, if the above logic is followed, the wrongdoer's creditors
would prefer this outcome. A bankruptcy court in its capacity as a court
of equity would certainly be concerned about performing its obligation to
achieve an equitable outcome for all concerned parties. It should be
noted that the property owners or interest holders in forfeiture proceed-
ings must establish their innocence or the innocence of the property
before they are entitled to have their claim or interest in the property
recognized; they must prove that they acted in good faith and without
knowledge of the nexus between the property and the alleged illegal act
or acts. 51 Such is not the case in the bankruptcy proceeding; the credi-
tor's innocence is immaterial because the only pertinent determination is
whether the creditor has a claim against the estate.52
The claimant/wrongdoer 3 whose property is the subject of forfei-
ture would also prefer the bankruptcy forum. Bankruptcy proceedings
do not have criminal trial overtones. Furthermore, the bankruptcy court
may be less familiar with the forfeiture provisions, and may be more con-
cerned with satisfying the greatest number of creditors than in ensuring
that the assets alleged to be forfeitable to the government are forfeited.
Additionally, the bankruptcy proceeding could delay and possibly avoid
the forfeiture proceeding.54
The government, on the other hand, would oppose the bankruptcy
court's control over the forfeiture proceeding or its jurisdiction over the
res for the reasons stated above. From the government's perspective, if a
claimant/wrongdoer's assets in a forfeiture escape through a bankruptcy
loophole, Congressional intent behind both the Bankruptcy Code and the
anti-drug forfeiture laws is defeated.
There are very few reported decisions in which this issue has been
addressed.5 5 Nonetheless, the bankruptcy tactic is likely to become more
frequently utilized as the number of forfeiture cases increases. Drug
punitive penalties, including prepetition tax penalties, are subordinated to the payment of all other
claims.... ." S. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 97, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5883. Forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 is based upon the property being
connected with criminal activity and not necessarily based upon the owner's wrongdoing. Though
unclear, Congress apparently intended to address monetary penalties on the basis of the debtor's
wrongdoing, not judgment against property based upon its connection to the illegal act.
51. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
52. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502 (1988).
53. "Claimant/wrongdoer" is used herein to encompass a culpable claimant (property owner)
in a civil forfeiture action.
54. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 726(a)(4) (1988).
55. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
1990]
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lords often launder money through banking institutions using various ne-
gotiable instruments of dummy corporations set up to conceal laundering
activities. These corporations, set up as a subterfuge to conceal the drug
organization's illegal activities, are expendable; throwing these corpora-
tions into bankruptcy does not damage the drug lord's empire. Bank-
ruptcy merely has the effect of paralyzing the government's efforts to
forfeit the assets of the drug lord; the corporations will claim the assets
belong to the bankrupt estate.
A. Governmental Goal: Pecuniary Gain or Exercise of Police Power
The automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362,56 which precludes
the continuation or commencement of judicial proceedings against the
debtor, has limitations. The key exceptions to the stay provision as re-
lated to forfeiture proceedings are sections 362(b)(4) and (5). These ex-
ceptions allow judicial proceedings to continue if the purpose is to
enforce a governmental unit's police or regulatory power.5 7 The key to
determining whether the forfeiture proceeding is automatically stayed
lies in whether the forfeiture action is an exercise of police power under
section 362(b)(4).
The case of In re Ryan (Ryan 1)8 determined that the forfeiture
proceeding initiated under Maryland state law was not an exercise of the
state's police power. The court based its decision on the fact that Mary-
land's in rem forfeiture proceeding is not pursuant to a health or safety
statute.5 9 Additionally, the court referred to the language in 11 U.S.C.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) and (5) (1988) state:
(b) the filing of a petition... does not operate as a stay-
(4)" under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an
action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or
regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other than a
money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power...
Id.
58. 15 Bankr. 514, 518 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981).
59. Id. at 519. The court stated: "Section 362(b)(1) is by its terms applicable only with respect
to criminal proceedings 'against the debtor.' The money in question here has been named by the
State as an in rem defendant in the forfeiture action. Such a proceeding is not excepted from the
broad scope of the automatic stay." Id. (footnote omitted). The court further dismissed section
362(b)(4) as an exception to the stay in this case, holding that the exception was meant to "encom-
pass only governmental action against the Debtor necessary to 'prevent or stop violation of fraud,
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws'." Id.
(quoting H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6299).
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§ 726'" which appears to place forfeiture determinations in a position
behind unsecured creditors in the order of receiving payment from the
distribution of the estate's assets.61 However, the Ryan I court did recog-
nize congressional intent to prevent individuals from using the Bank-
ruptcy Code as a means to escape the consequences of wrongful behavior
by subordinating forfeiture claims and by providing that forfeiture claims
are not dischargeable.6' Finally, the court did not reach the issue of
whether to hear the state forfeiture action in its forum as such relief was
not sought by the state. The state court forfeiture proceeding, however,
was stayed.63
The state then sought relief from the automatic stay. In re Ryan II
(Ryan II)' determined that the automatic stay should be modified to
allow the state court to proceed with the forfeiture action, but only to
judgment.6' The Ryan 11 court held that at that time the money would
become a non-exempt part of the estate to be distributed according to the
provisions of section 726.66 The court felt that the relation-back doc-
trine67 contained in Maryland's state law would run afoul of the
Supremacy and Bankruptcy clauses of the United States Constitution.68
In addition, the court decided that Congress intended through the provi-
sions of section 726 that the estate not be depleted as a result of the
debtor's wrongdoing.69
A later Maryland case, In re Reid,70 applied a different analysis to
the same issue. Unlike Ryan I, the court in Reid determined that the
debtor's right to claim the property was the only property interest the
debtor possessed. Therefore the "right" was the only interest that passed
into the bankruptcy estate.71 The Reid court reasoned that the language
of the Maryland statute reserved title to the property in the state and left
only an interest to reclaim the property by the debtor.72 Though the
60. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988).
61. Ryan, 15 Bankr. at 519.
62. Id. at 520 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)).
63. Id. at 520-21.
64. 32 Bankr. 794 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983).
65. Id. at 799.
66. Id. at 798.
67. See infra notes 86-108 and accompanying text.
68. Ryan II, 32 Bankr. at 797.
69. Id.
70. 60 Bankr. 301 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986).
71. Id. at 305.
72. Id. The court stated: "[Tihe extent of the debtor's interest in the currency at the com-
mencement of the case was a right to claim the currency at a forfeiture hearing; that such interest
became property of the estate upon commencement of the case. . . ." Id.
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result was contra to Ryan I and Ryan II, the Reid court still refused to
modify the stay in order to allow the state to continue its forfeiture case
in state court. Instead, the bankruptcy court held the forfeiture
hearing.73
This line of cases appears to support the fact that civil forfeitures are
not an exercise of a governmental unit's police power; nevertheless, the
legislative history behind the 1984 amendments to 21 U.S.C. § 88174 and
the Bankruptcy Code indicate the converse.75 The comments made dur-
ing the 1978 revision of the Bankruptcy Code indicate that the automatic
stay had been over used in the area of governmental regulation. 76 Corre-
spondingly, section 362(b)(4) was inserted to protect the government's
right to protect the public health, welfare, and safety.77 Likewise, a re-
view of the history of amendments to 21 U.S.C. § 881 indicates that the
civil forfeiture actions were created to protect the public by reducing ille-
gal drug-related activities.73 Congress also appears to treat the respective
criminal and civil forfeiture provisions, 21 U.S.C. § 848 and 21 U.S.C.
§ 881, similarly, with the intent that they work together in the war
against illegal narcotics.' 9
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ex-
plicitly addressed similar concerns for public safety. "The bankruptcy
laws are not a haven for criminal offenders, but are designed to give relief
from financial over-extension."' 0 Therefore, allowing the automatic stay
to preclude a civil forfeiture action8l runs afoul with the expressed Con-
gressional intent to protect the public and guard against the bankruptcy
courts being used as a haven for criminal offenders.
The question, then, is whether forfeiture of property under Section
881 will be permitted to proceed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) and (5).12
73. Id. at 306. Applying Maryland law, the court determined that some of the money sought to
be forfeited was not criminally derived, therefore not forfeitable, and ordered those funds turned
over to the bankruptcy trustee. Id. at 308
74. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
75. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 174, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS. 5963, 6135.
76. Id.
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(4) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 75, at 175, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6135.
78. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3374.
79. Id. at 3398.
80. 134 Baker Street, Inc. v. Georgia, 47 Bankr. 379, 381 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 595, supra note 75, at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6299).
81. Criminal forfeitures are permitted to proceed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1988).
82. See text of statute, supra note 57.
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The district court in 134 Baker Street, Inc. v. Georgia 83 set forth a test for
this determination. If the primary motivation for the government's ac-
tion is pecuniary, such as obtaining payment of a dischargeable debt,
rather than public duty or punishment, the government's proceeding
should be stayed by the bankruptcy court.84 On the other hand, if the
purpose of the government's action is to punish criminal conduct and
"vindicate the public welfare," the stay should not stall the action.8
B. The Relation-Back Doctrine
Probably the strongest argument in the government's favor is the
application of the relation-back doctrine as stated in United States v.
Stowell.86 Stowell discussed the applicable forfeiture statute for the ille-
gal operation of a distillery. The Court ruled that where a statute pro-
vides for the forfeiture of property to the government upon the
commission of a certain act, the right to the property vests in the govern-
ment at the time the illegal act is committed.87 Though the government's
title is not perfected until judicial decree, the forfeiture relates back to the
time of the illegal act.88 This allows the government's title to supersede
any sale or alienation made after the forfeiting event, even as to good-
faith purchasers.89
Because the relation-back doctrine could produce rather harsh re-
sults, some courts have resisted its application via strict construction.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Currency Totalling
$48,318.0890 held that the doctrine applies only where forfeiture is
clearly mandated by the forfeiture statute.91 A similar decision was
reached by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Thir-
teen Thousand Dollars in United States Currency92 in construing Section
881. The court ruled that the Section 881 language, "subject to forfei-
ture," is permissive and does not mandate forfeiture; the subsequent lien
83. 47 Bankr. 379 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
84. Id. at 382.
85. Id.
86. 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
87. Id. at 16-17 ("By the settled doctrine of this court, whenever a statute enacts that upon the
commission of a certain act specific property used in or connected with that act shall be forfeited, the
forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the act ... .
88. Id. at 17.
89. Id.
90. 609 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 213 (language of Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, "subject to
seizure and forfeiture," was merely permissive, not mandatory, therefore the Stowell relation-back
doctrine was inapplicable).
92. 733 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1984).
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of an attorney for services rendered in the case was not extinguished by
the relation-back doctrine.93
These decisions have been questioned by other courts in more recent
rulings. The Supreme Court of Colorado refused to follow this line of
thinking in United States v. Wilkinson.94 The court reviewed a forfeiture
case under the Colorado abatement of nuisance statute that contained the
"subject to forfeiture" language. In holding that the relation-back doc-
trine applied to this type of statute, the court reasoned that public policy
and legislative intent would otherwise be subverted.95 If title were not
divested at the time of the illegal act, the wrongdoer/owner could trans-
fer all interests in the subject property to a sympathetic party and thus
defeat the intent of the law.96
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically rejected the narrow
construction proffered by the Fifth Circuit in Currency Totalling
$48,318.08. In Eggleston v. Colorado,97 the Tenth Circuit held that the
"subject to" language of Section 881 did not preclude the application of
the relation-back doctrine. 98 The court noted that decisions of United
States courts have consistently upheld the doctrine of relation-back; in
fact, Congress amended Section 881 in 1984 to codify the doctrine within
the statute.99 Legislative history of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984 1°° reflects that Congress recognized that the doctrine is
"well-established in the current law." 10' Therefore, the court reasoned
93. Id. at 584. The government argued that the attorney did not have standing to contest the
forfeiture as any rights in the property he may have acquired were after the illegal act and therefore
void as to the government's interest under the relation-back doctrine. Id. The court, relying in part
on Currency Totalling $48,318.08, disagreed, interpreting Section 881 as a permissive forfeiture stat-
ute to which the relation-back doctrine did not apply. Id.
94. 686 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1984).
95. Id. at 792-93.
96. Id. The court then applied the relation-back doctrine, thereby divesting the wrongdoer of
all property interests in the subject res at the time the illegal act was committed. Id. at 794.
97. 873 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-699 (1989 W.L. 136766).
98. Id. at 24647. The case contains a lengthy discussion of the relation-back doctrine. In addi-
tion to holding that the doctrine applies to Section 881, the court stated that the exception for
innocent lienholders does not defeat the doctrine's application to non-innocent claimants. Id. at 247.
See also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); infra note 102.
99. Eggleston, 873 F.2d at 247. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (Supp. V 1987) states:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest
in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.
Id.
100. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1827 (1984).
101. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 215, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182, 3398. The Senate Report states: "The principle that the interest of the United States in
forfeited property vests at the time of the acts giving rise to the forfeiture is well established in the
context of civil forfeitures." Id.
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that an action brought under Section 881 vests title in the government at
the time of the illegal act, subject only to the innocent claimant exception
of section 881.102 The innocent owner, however, must have a vested in-
terest in the subject property prior to the illegal act. °3
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the
Stowell relation-back doctrine as valid in two cases involving attorney
fees paid with assets subject to forfeiture."° These cases involved the
forfeiture of property under the criminal narcotic forfeiture statute, 21
U.S.C. § 853,105 including money used to pay the defendants' attorney
fees." 6 The relation-back doctrine was asserted by the government and
upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court stated specifically in Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States that the statute "reflects the applica-
tion of the long-recognized and lawful practice of vesting title to any
forfeitable assets, in the United States, at the time of the criminal act
giving rise to forfeiture."' 1 7 The Court affirmed the doctrine's applica-
tion even as to attorney fees for the representation of a defendant in a
criminal trial. 0
8
C. Abstention and Withdrawal
1. Abstention
The doctrine of relation-back should thus be a serious consideration
of a bankruptcy court when deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction
over a forfeiture matter or abstaining from it altogether until the forfei-
ture action is completed.' 09 If the title to the property at issue is vested
102. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) states in part: "[No property shall be for-
feited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omis-
sion established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent
of that owner." Id.
103. Eggleston, 873 F.2d at 248.
104. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989); United States v.
Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
105. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (Supp. V 1987).
106. The issue presented in both cases was whether the section 853 forfeiture of money used to
pay attorney fees violated the defendants' rights to counsel under the sixth amendment of the Consti-
tution. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2649; Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2659. In both cases the court upheld
forfeiture as constitutional. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2649; Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2659.
107. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2653 (upholding 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) which provides for vesting of the
property interest in the United States at the time of the criminal act, thereby avoiding any subse-
quent transfer to a third party who has cause to believe that the property is subject to a criminal
forfeiture).
108. Id. at 2652 ("A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person's [the
government's] money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the only way that
the defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his choice.").
109. 11 U.S.C. § 305 (1988) allows the bankruptcy court, after notice and hearing, to dismiss a
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in the government at the time of the illegal act,110 the property cannot
become a part of the bankruptcy estate. Should the property alleged to
be forfeitable be a significant part of the debtor's total estate, the bank-
ruptcy proceeding would be a complete waste of time for all concerned.
The bankruptcy court should abstain until the forfeiture proceeding is
resolved.
2. Withdrawal
In addition, because of the substantial impact the forfeiture proceed-
ing may have upon the estate, the district court which has original juris-
diction over all title 11 matters may withdraw the bankruptcy case to its
forum.III However, when considering whether to urge the district court
to withdraw its referral to the bankruptcy court, certain matters should
be considered. The bankruptcy court may hear and determine all cases
,"arising under title 1 12 and "all core proceedings arising under title
11, or arising in a case under title 1.""3 Furthermore, the district court
may be reluctant to withdraw where the subject res is related to Title 11.
Nevertheless, if the matter can be determined upon non-bankruptcy is-
sues and if those issues could substantially affect the outcome of the
bankruptcy, the district court could exercise the power granted it under
Section 157(d). 114
The district court may decide to withdraw referral of a case to the
bankruptcy court after considering the outer boundaries of the bank-
ruptcy court's jurisdiction suggested in Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 5 In Marathon, the Court held that 28
U.S.C. § 1471(b)" 6 was an unconstitutional grant of power to the bank-
ruptcy court, an article I court, as it conferred jurisdiction over matters
that should be determined only by article III judges."I7
case or suspend it if "the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such a
dismissal or suspension."
110. See supra notes 86-108 and accompanying text.
Il. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (Supp. V 1987).
112. Id § 157(a).
113. Id. § 157(b)(1).
114. Id. § 157(d).
115. 458 U.S. 50 (1982),jdmL stayed, 459 U.S. 813 (1982). See also In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
63 Bankr. 600, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
116. 21 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) stated in pertinent part that the bankruptcy
court had jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under Title I 1 or arising in or related to
cases under Title 1 I." Id.
117. The distinction between article III judges and adjunct judges is crucial in determining
whether the power granted to the adjuncts is unconstitutional. Article III judges are appointed for
life and can be removed only by impeachment. Additionally, their salaries cannot be reduced during
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Reacting to the Marathon decision, Congress amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 157118 to provide for mandatory withdrawal of reference when the res-
olution of a case hinges on issues related to "other laws of the United
States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate com-
merce." 119 The withdrawal may be accomplished sua sponte or by a
timely filed motion. 2 '
Withdrawal issues have subsequently been decided by some courts
with great awareness of Marathon. In In re Johns-Manville Corp., 2 ' the
district court specifically noted the import of Marathon in its ruling.' 22
The district court held that mandatory withdrawal was appropriate when
key issues required interpretation of federal environmental statutes.123
Similarly, the forfeiture issue would hardly be appropriately within the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court as it also clearly involves "other laws
of the United States" affecting interstate commerce.
However, in practice, withdrawal under section 157(d) rarely oc-
curs, as district courts are generally not equipped to adjudicate entire
bankruptcy cases as efficiently as bankruptcy courts. The better result is
an abstention by the bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.C. § 305.124
D. Application of Custodia Legis
Custodia legis literally translated means "in the custody of the
law,"' 25 but the term as a doctrine refers to a "first come, first served"
method of settling disputes between courts of concurrent jurisdiction
over the same property.'26 Strictly applied, the doctrine gives priority to
the court that first secured actual or constructive possession of the
their service. On the other hand, bankruptcy judges are appointed for fourteen year terms, may be
removed by a judicial council, and their salaries are not immune to reduction by Congress. Hence,
adjunct judges are not so free from political influence as article III judges. See generally Marathon,
458 U.S. at 60-61.
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (Supp. V 1987). See also In re White Motor Corp., 42 Bankr. 693,
697 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).
120. Id.
121. 63 Bankr. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
122. Id. at 602. Another court believed that a determination of the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion began with a discussion of Marathon in Harley Hotels, Inc. v. Rain's Int'l Ltd., 57 Bankr. 773
(M.D. Pa. 1985), but that court determined that neither withdrawal or abstention was required to
resolve the issue of assumption of an executory contract. Id. at 783-84.
123. Johns-Manville, 63 Bankr. at 603.
124. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1988).
125. BLACK'S LAWv DICTIONARY 460 (4th ed. 1968).
126. Coastal Production Credit Ass'n v. Oil Screw "Santee," 51 Bankr. 1018, 1020 (S.D. Ga.
1985).
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property. 127
The custodia legis doctrine has a long history. In a late 1800's case,
Moran v. Sturges,'28 the United States Supreme Court considered the
doctrine to be a general principle of law. 129 The Moran court stated that
a particular court had possession of certain property when it was "taken
and held" by virtue of that court's process. 130 Once this was established,
another court could not disturb that court's power over the property un-
til the matter was resolved. 131
In a scenario where certain property is involved in a forfeiture pro-
ceeding (the property has been attached by order of the district court)
and the owner/claimant challenges the action, then files for relief in
bankruptcy, a conflict arises as to which court has jurisdiction.132 Moran
gives jurisdiction to the district court because it had custody first, 133 but
the modem application of custodia legis in this situation is not clear. 134
Such a case as detailed in the above-mentioned scenario has yet to be
reported. Hence, an analysis of various custodia legis decisions may, by
analogy, provide a method or rationale for its application in Section 881
versus Bankruptcy Code disputes. Though courts have applied the doc-
trine in cases where the subject property was an appeal bond, 135 stock
held by a court as security for a judgment lien, 136 or property obtained
through a writ of replevin, 137 the seemingly most applicable cases are
admiralty forfeiture decisions.
127. Id
128. 154 U.S. 256 (1894).
129. The Court stated: "It is a rule of general application that where property is in the actual
possession of one court of competent jurisdiction, such possession cannot be disturbed by process out
of another court." Id. at 274.
130. Id.
131. Id'
132. The district court's jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (the federal question arising
under 21 U.S.C. § 881) and the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over Title 11 matters is grounded in
28 U.S.C. § 1334.
133. See Coastal Production Credit Ass'n v. Oil Screw "Santee," 51 Bankr. 1018, 1020 (S.D. Ga.
1985).
134. Courts are split over the application of the doctrine of custodia legis if one of the conflicting
courts is a bankruptcy court. See id. (the Coastal Production court perceived the application of the
doctrine turning on the comparable objectives, primarily equitable, of the two courts).
135. See, eg., Mid-Jersey Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity Mortgage Investors, 518 F.2d 640 (3d Cir.
1975). The court held that the only property interest retained by the debtor wasoa contingency. Id.
at 644.
136. See, eg., In re Braen, 72 Bankr. 56 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1987) (The possession of the stock
certificates by the court constituted perfection which defeated the bankruptcy trustee's position as
lien creditor.).
137. See, eg., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970) (The court con-
cluded that the writ of replevin placed the property in the custody of the court under its control until
final judgment, whether or not the court had actual possession.).
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The case of Ciel Y Cia v. Nereide Societa di Navigazione Per
Azioni 3 involved a ship which was subject to attachment under admi-
ralty law in the district court. 139 The owner filed bankruptcy three
months after the attachment."4 The court first noted its awareness of
the then-recent Marathon decision' 4 ' and concluded that not only did
the doctrine of custodia legis place the proper jurisdiction in the hands of
the district court but the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to deter-
mine admiralty claims. 42
A forfeiture pursuant to Section 881 is not unlike the situation in
Ciel. The forfeiture is predicated on law not familiar to the bankruptcy
court and, as in the scenario previously mentioned, the attachment by
order of the district court places the property in the custody of that
court. Because its custody and control precedes that of the bankruptcy
court, the doctrine of custodia legis should operate to grant subject mat-
ter jurisdiction exclusively in the district court until the forfeiture pro-
ceeding is finalized. It should be noted that this doctrine could work
against a prosecutor when the debtor/wrongdoer anticipates the forfei-
ture and files for bankruptcy before the forfeiture procedure is initiated
by attachment.
V. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE BANKRUPTCY
"DEFENSE"
At present, the drug war is at the forefront in the minds of politi-
cians, law enforcement officials, and the general public. Forfeiture laws,
both state and federal, are vital weapons in our nation's fight against
drugs. Consequently, bankruptcy courts should carefully circumspect
what course to take when presented with a case which involves a civil
forfeiture proceeding.
Even assuming that a bankruptcy petition is filed in good faith,14 3
the bankruptcy court, being aware of the implications of the Section 881
provision vesting title in the government upon commission of the act
which gives rise to the forfeiture, should suspend its proceedings under
138. 28 Bankr. 378 (E.D. Va. 1983).
139. Id. at 381.
140. Id
141. Id. at 380.
142. Id at 380-82.
143. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1988) states in part that the court will confirm a plan only if it has
been proposed in good faith. Id. The court in In re Sanders, 28 Bankr. 917 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983),
determined that a debtor's plan under Chapter 13 should be denied as the purpose of the filing was to
manipulate the system to avoid $70,000.00 of debt tainted with fraud. Id. at 922.
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11 U.S.C. § 305, either upon motion of the government or sua sponte.
The suspension would allow the district court to proceed to determine
outcome of the forfeiture case, thereby properly defining what assets re-
main in the debtor's estate.
Another approach would allow the government to move the district
court to withdraw its referral to the bankruptcy court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 157(d)14 and to resolve the issues in both the bankruptcy case
and the forfeiture case. This avenue would not only satisfy the concerns
of Marathon but would also promote efficiency. In the case of Wooten v.
DOI,4 ' a district court in Louisiana followed this approach and held
that withdrawal was appropriate if resolution of the action required
"substantial and material considerations" of non-bankruptcy statutes.146
As indicated earlier, it is essential that the forfeiture issues be ad-
dressed prior to any determination of the extent of the bankrupt debtor's
estate. The relation-back doctrine vests title in the government prior to
the bankruptcy petition, leaving in the estate at most a right to claim the
property subject to forfeiture. Additionally, the doctrine of custodia legis
places the res within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court when
the forfeiture proceeding is initiated prior to the bankruptcy filing. Un-
doubtedly, the proper course would be either to suspend the bankruptcy
proceeding until the forfeiture case is resolved, to grant relief from the
automatic stay under the police power provision, or to adjudicate both
the bankruptcy and the forfeiture cases in the district court.
Similar procedures should apply to state forfeiture proceedings as
well because the governmental purposes are the same. Certainly the
Supremacy Clause was not intended by the framers to act as a method of
avoiding state laws necessary for the protection of public interests. Fur-
thermore, the bankruptcy court is no better equipped to adjudicate a
state forfeiture proceeding than it is to adjudicate a federal forfeiture
proceeding.
The above-noted approaches would best serve the legislative intent
behind 21 U.S.C. § 881, the various state forfeiture laws, and the Bank-
ruptcy Code. In order to insure that the bankruptcy forum is not abused,
144. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) states in part: "The district court shall, on timely
motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding
requires consideration of both title I 1 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or
activities affecting interstate commerce." Id.
145. 52 Bankr. 74 (W.D. La. 1985).
146. Id. at 75 (citing In re White Motor Corp., 42 Bankr. 693, 703-05 (N.D. Ohio 1984)).
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forfeiture proceedings must be separate and detached from the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Additionally, the Constitution and well settled case
law support the proposition that a bankruptcy court exercising its juris-
diction over a forfeiture proceeding is both improper and premature.
Michael S. Linscott
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